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Abstract 
This paper argues for an ‘ancient’ institutional school, predating Thorstein Veblen’s 
‘old’ institutionalism. In this view, going back as far as the thirteenth century, 
institutions tended to be seen as specific to a mode of production. Here both institutions 
and development itself are context-specific and activity-specific. Much clearer than 
today the arrows of causality of economic development go from the mode of production 
to the institutional setting, not vice versa. In order to understand development, 
institutions can also usefully be divided into Hayekian institutions that facilitate 
equilibrium and Schumpeterian institutions that enable the dynamics of development 
and structural change. 
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Introduction 
As a result of the inability of mainstream economics to tackle prominent problems of 
the global economy, some of its basic assumptions are increasingly being questioned. In 
this context, the standard emphasis on methodological individualism is gradually being 
eased in favour of studying the institutional structures necessary for economic 
development: the social, cultural, and political norms and habits economists had come 
to take for granted. This ‘institutionalist’ approach is most often traced back to the work 
of Thorstein Veblen in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. My essay shows 
how an acute awareness of the importance of institutions, and more specifically of a 
certain kind of institutions, in fact has been explicitly present in the history of economic 
thought and policy at least since the Renaissance. Therefore, in addition to the ‘new’ 
institutional economics of Douglass North and the ‘old’ institutional economics of 
Veblen and Commons, there existed an ‘ancient’ tradition of institutional economics 
which, among other things, informed the policies responsible for the European miracle 
in the early modern period. 
In light of this ‘ancient’ institutionalism, I wish to explore its relevance for economic 
development. Whereas today’s literature tends to discuss institutions independent of the 
type of productive structure they support, both the ‘ancient’ and the ‘old’ institutional 
schools saw institutions as an integral part of a particular production system. Different 
technological systems, or modes of production, were seen as requiring different 
institutions, and an institution per se could not change the technological system. 
Whereas institutions like property rights and universal suffrage today often are seen as 
promoting economic development, I wish to show that the arrows of causality 
historically have been considered going in the opposite direction. In fact, the institution 
of insurance came about after the need for it developed out of risky long-distance trade, 
and modern democracies, in any meaningful sense, were the fruits of literate urban 
artisan and working classes rather than of feudalism.  
It is therefore not entirely clear that the Masaai are poor and stuck in subsistence 
agriculture because they lack property rights. Perhaps, I would argue, they lack property 
rights because they are poor and stuck in subsistence agriculture. In other words the 
problem lies in their mode of production – subsistence agriculture rather than e.g. 
manufacturing – and not narrowly in an institutional arrangement in a restricted sense. 
An institution that suits one production system may not suit another. It can for example 
be argued that the sequential usufruct of land found in pastoral societies1 is much better 
suited to that particular mode of production than are capitalist property rights. Precisely 
because institutions and mode of production of a society obviously evolved together, 
institutions cannot be meaningfully studied separately from a technological system 
which needed and created them. Today one side of the equation – institutions in 
isolation as instruments favouring development – has too often been emphasized, 
skewing our understanding of economic and institutional development. 
                                                 
1   Sequential usufruct means that, rooted on traditional usage, different groups use the same land at 
different times of the year. Property rights in the capitalist sense do not exist. The system can best be 
compared to ‘time-sharing’ of apartments as practiced in many holiday resorts today.   2
‘The discipline of daily life acts to alter or reinforce the received habits of thought, and 
so acts to alter or fortify the received institutions under which men live’ says Veblen 
(1961: 314). In this paper I argue that a conscious element should be added to this 
theory: there are, I will argue, enabling institutions that are deliberately created in order 
to induce change, as integral parts of the dynamics of evolving systems of production. 
This was one of the principal arguments of the great Enlightenment philosopher Denis 
Diderot in his Supplément au Voyage de Bougainville: by studying the recently 
discovered Tahitian society, Diderot argued, one could observe how these Polynesian 
islanders had consciously developed social and political institutions supportive of their 
desired polity. They had not tailored institutions to the needs of a static society, but 
rather to a dynamic system with the prospects of future growth and development 
(Muthu 2003: 54-55). Some institutions, I will argue, are created pro-actively in order to 
promote change (e.g. patents, scientific academies), others appear through a more re-
active process as solutions to ‘reverse salients’ (e.g. insurance facilitating long-distance 
trading) that hinder the development of the system (Hughes 1987).2 These two forms 
are clearly closely related, but differ qualitatively in being more or less pro-active or re-
active in nature. 
I propose to use Werner Sombart’s classic distinction between passivistic-materialistic 
and  activistic-idealistic  economics to explore the different trajectories of political 
economy (in the sense of their ‘ideal types’) as they developed since the Renaissance. 
The latter focused on production rather than trade and anchored its analysis of economic 
development in institutions and social synergies, using the human body as the basic 
metaphor for society. The former – founding economics on physics-based metaphors – 
focused on trade rather than production and dismissed institutions and social synergies. 
The practical consequences of this dismissal are, I will argue, highly dramatic. One 
fundamental problem of today’s development debate is that the vast majority of 
participants come from the passivistic-materialistic tradition which – since Adam Smith 
– has largely exogenized production and unlearned Werner Sombart’s definition of 
capitalism as consisting of (1) the entrepreneur, (2) the modern state, and (3) the 
industrial system (Reinert 2006). At its core the history of institutions is a history of the 
Schumpeterian institutions that enabled the growth and spread of this industrial system 
across the developed world. By this definition, capitalism never reached the production 
system of the colonies, colonialism was for centuries in effect a technology policy 
aimed at keeping industry out of the colonies. Herein lie the problems of Third World 
poverty, not in their geography or climate. 
I have previously argued (Reinert 1999) that economic development is activity-specific, 
tied to certain economic activities exhibiting high productivity growth and increasing 
returns in a synergetic system formed by the presence of a large division of labour, in 
short what Werner Sombart calls ‘the industrial system’. That only the presence of such 
an industrial system will create efficient agriculture was a key insight of the 1700s 
(Reinert and Reinert 2005) that was also at the core of US development and industrial 
policy into the twentieth century. The inability of neo-classical tools to capture these 
                                                 
2   I am consciously comparing the structural development of an economy to that of an evolving 
technological system, and adopting the term reverse salient from the technological systems literature. 
‘A salient is a protrusion in a geometric figure, a line of battle, or an expanding weather front. As 
technological systems expand, reverse salients develop. Reverse salients are components in the system 
that have fallen behind or are out of phase with the others’ (Hughes 1987).   3
production-specific variables has lead to the ‘Geography, Climate and Disease School 
of Poverty’, which in a sense is right for the wrong reason. What this school fails to see 
is that it was the policy of diversification away from raw materials, creating an 
industrial system, which made the presently developed countries rich. Climate enters the 
picture only indirectly, via Veblenian vested interests. The temperate zone attracted 
enough immigration to create a vested interest for protecting local industry even against 
the mother country (e.g. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa), whereas the 
settlers in the tropical countries were mainly exporting raw materials. The experience of 
Rhodesia shows how real wages increased dramatically when the boycott forced the 
white settlers there to industrialize. As was the case with the United States under the 
Napoleonic Wars, a boycott created a highly beneficial involuntary import substitution. 
Finally, much as there are Hayekian and Schumpeterian entrepreneurs, who create 
wealth by respectively furthering and destroying economic equilibrium, there are 
institutions that oil the equilibrium system as well as institutions that promote 
disequilibrium. What I suggest calling Hayekian institutions3 (e.g. money, law and 
order, property rights) help smoothing the operations of a static system in equilibrium, 
while Schumpeterian institutions (e.g. patents, tariffs, scientific academies) have 
historically been important in creating new knowledge and new economic activities, that 
is, the dynamic disequilibria that are the essence of economic change and development. 
Similarly, I will show how institutions can change character over time, and how our 
taxonomy of institutions might benefit from a broader analysis of their costs and 
benefits in different contexts, an approach that was far from unknown to the ‘ancient’ 
institutionalists. Institutions that at one point were beneficial can also, with the passage 
of time, become roadblocks for development. In terms of economic development, we 
must therefore never forget that the institutions necessary for Third World development 
may – at any point in time – be very different from those beneficial to the industrialized 
world, and that our past, the only real laboratory of the economics profession, still is 
able to shed light on the future development of the world’s poor. 
The Renaissance and the birth of Schumpeterian institutions 
‘It is not sufficient to inquire whether an institution of the state is attested to have been 
founded by our ancestors. Rather it is necessary that we understand and explain why it 
was instituted. For it is by knowing the cause that we gain knowledge of a thing’. This 
statement on methodology is found in an analysis of the Florentine Constitution written 
in 1413 (Baron 1966: 207) at the request of Emperor Sigismund of the Holy Roman 
Empire. The author, Leonardo Bruni (1369-1444), represents what has become known 
as the school of civic humanism, the ideology of the successful Italian city-states of the 
Renaissance. 
Bruni’s description of Florence and its institutions represents something of a watershed 
in the social sciences. While earlier literature tended to focus on mere descriptions of 
facts, Bruni creates an analysis of economic institutions combining both the dynamics 
of causality and deliberate design. Institutions, he argued, tend to be created with a 
                                                 
3   The two Austrian economists Friedrich von Hayek and Joseph Schumpeter emphasized two different 
aspects of entrepreneurship, a factor which is generally neglected in neo-classical theory.   4
clear purpose in mind, as part of a conscious strategy aimed at achieving defined 
dynamic political and/or economic goals. These were institutions aimed at breaking the 
equilibrium of the Middle Ages: they were change-inducing and change-enabling 
institutions that I suggest calling Schumpeterian institutions. The ability to create such 
Schumpeterian institutions that enables the structural change that we call economic 
development – and to change these institutions when new conditions so require – comes 
across as a key feature of the organizational capability of any society. 
While the study of institutions themselves seems to grow out of the mediaeval legal 
tradition, the appearance of this change-inducing type of institutions increased in 
importance as a new cosmology unlocked the previous zero-sum worldview (Reinert 
and Reinert 2005). Many of the necessary elements can be traced far back in time, but 
only during the period we have come to call the Renaissance did they achieve a critical 
mass sufficient to profoundly change society in the whole Italian peninsula, and later, 
the rest of Europe. First of all, the undeniable urban bias of wealth creation was, at the 
time, identified as the result of synergic effects, what Florentine chancellor Brunetto 
Latini (c.1210-94) had called the ‘common good’ (Latini 1993). This ben comune that 
made some cities so wealthy (Machiavelli, in Reinert and Daastøl 1997) sprang from an 
organic social synergy, seeing the body as the metaphor for society. This idea of a 
synergic common good forms the nexus from which the ideas of enabling institution 
grew. 
Second, upon this synergetic understanding of wealth creation, the Renaissance 
famously put the individual into focus. It must, however, be emphasized that the 
discovery of the role of the individual during the Renaissance was superimposed upon 
the already existing idea of the synergic common weal of society. The economic theory 
and practice of the period – often known as Mercantilism – had a dual vision where the 
interests both of society and of the individual had to be considered, and at times had to 
be traded off against one another. In this tradition wealth and ‘public happiness’ were 
forged within the framework of the nation (e.g. Schmoller 1897/1967). 
At the same time, the Aristotelian view of society as a zero-sum game slowly gave way 
to an understanding that new wealth could be created through new knowledge and 
innovations. Indeed, the very meaning of the word innovations changed, from being a 
potentially heretical activity—as when Roger Bacon was arrested in Oxford for 
‘suspicious innovations’ in 1277—to being the new carrier of human welfare and 
happiness when Francis Bacon wrote An Essay on Innovations a little more than 300 
years later (Reinert and Daastøl 1997). New scientific breakthroughs and geographical 
and scientific explorations slowly changed the static medieval worldview. This growing 
understanding of an infinite and expanding cosmos was the precondition for the 
mercantilist reinterpretation of the economic sphere: as cosmos expanded unendingly, 
so could the economy. There was a remarkable synergy observable between innovation 
and exploration, between theory and practice, in weaving the new European cosmology. 
The Italian economic historian Amintore Fanfani encapsulated this shift to a dynamic 
world view well: ‘while scholasticism thinks of an order in equilibrium, mercantilism 
thinks of an order in growth’ (Fanfani 1955: 149). The Medieval scholastics saw the 
universe as fundamentally static, while the mercantilists envisioned the cosmos as   5
expanding, permanently in flux. Based on this, they created institutions in order to 
promote and spread economic growth.4 
The same 1400s, when Leonardo Bruni wrote, later saw the birth of two important 
economic institutions: both children of the same Weltanschauung,  both created 
specifically in order to increase and spread knowledge: patents (to make new inventions 
profitable) and strategic tariff protection (in order to make it profitable to spread 
inventions to new geographical areas: to spread manufacturing). Although tariffs had 
been used to raise revenue since ‘three-score years after the Birth of Christ’ according to 
a seventeenth century author, their use as part of as strategy of change is only clear with 
Henry VII of England in 1485.5 The first patents also appear during the last two decades 
of the quattrocento,  in Venice. In the right circumstances, these institutions have 
remained successful and visible hands of economic development ever since. 
The study of institutions, then, has been part of social and political science for a very 
long time. Jakob Friedrich von Bielfeld’s cameralist treatise in economics entitled 
Institutions politiques was first published in 1760, and reached a total of twelve editions 
in French, German, Italian, Spanish and Russian (Bielfeld 1760, Carpenter 1975). 
However, as we shall discuss later, this venerable emphasis on the importance of 
institutions in economic and political development was excluded from the toolbox when 
Adam Smith set the stage of modern economics. Smith’s economics became what 
nineteenth century continental economists called catalectics, that is, the science of 
exchange, not of production. In this science of barter, trade and exchange, the dynamics 
of knowledge, technology and production and the Schumpeterian institutions that are 
needed to support them tended to disappear. 
Consequently, important aspects of the scholastic equilibrium world view returned with 
physics-based equilibrium economics (neo-classical economics) (Reinert 2000b). Here 
economics became a theory of accumulation of capital and allocation of resources, 
rather than of the creation and assimilation of new knowledge. The dynamic institutions 
that were products of the Renaissance world view – such as patents and protection6 – 
became foreign bodies in neo-classical economic theory. With the methodological 
individualism of neo-classical theory, the fifteenth century view of wealth as a 
synergetic phenomenon in society – so important for understanding institutions – also 
disappeared. 
I suggest then that in addition to the ‘old’ institutional school originating with Thorstein 
Veblen and associated with the later US institutionalists and the ‘new’ institutional 
school built on neo-classical economics, an ‘ancient’ institutional school also exists. 
This is not a radical preposition per se, as the nineteenth century American 
historiography out of which Veblen’s Theory of the Leisure Class emerged was well 
                                                 
4   Appendix 1 lists a selection of mercantilist Schumpeterian institutions and policies. 
5   We know that Henry’s strategy from 1485 was an attempt to replicate the economic structure in the 
part of France where he had grown up (Reinert 1996), but it is also quite possible that it was built on 
observation of how previous revenue tariffs in England had, as beneficial unintended by-products, 
changed economic structures and created more wealth. 
6   Only vested interests and political power are able to explain why patents are promoted and protection 
abhorred in today’s trade politics: From a neo-classical point of view these institutions should be 
equally abhorred.    6
versed in the study of ancient institutions. Henry Sumner Maine’s seminal 1875 
Lectures on The Early History of Institutions, which ventured as far back as the 
institutional structures of the pre-Christian druids,  can indeed be seen as forming a 
bridge between the ‘ancient’ and the ‘old’ institutional schools. Veblen quoted the book 
often, and studied with Maine’s heirs at Cornell in the early 1890s.7 
Institutions and economic traditions in the context of the present development 
debate 
From this vantage point, the present debate on the role of institutions in economic 
development – ably described in the papers by Chang (2006) and Evans (2006) – 
unveils a fault line that has been a dominant feature of economics since the eighteenth 
century. Werner Sombart (1928: 919), the great analyst of capitalism, generally 
distinguished between the activistic-idealistic Renaissance tradition – which I refer to as 
The Other Canon (Reinert and Daastøl 2004) – and the passivistic-materialistic tradition 
which originated in the eighteenth century with Bernhard Mandeville, Physiocracy, and 
Adam Smith. 
The tradition in which Leonardo Bruni wrote is the prototypical activistic-idealistic type 
of economics, a tradition that considered economic development the result of deliberate 
design. In this tradition Italian economists Givanni Botero (1590) and Antonio Serra 
(1613) explained uneven economic development as resulting from differences in the 
productive structures of nations; of scale, increasing and diminishing returns, degree of 
division of labour and synergies. The large division of labour in the Italian city states – 
compared to the situation in the countryside – gave birth to relative political freedom, to 
the rule of law, and to the institutions protecting property rights. Strikingly, the first 
cadastral register in Venice was created already in the years 1148-56. 
The analysis of the activistic-idealistic tradition also included factors like geography 
and climate. While it was exceedingly obvious to economic writers at the time that 
wealth often depended on geographical factors (Reinert 2004b), it was certainly viable 
to compensate for ‘bad’ geography with good economic policy. It was clear to most 
observers in the activistic-idealistic tradition that the few wealthy areas of Europe 
tended to be islands, and that this was no coincidence. In the ‘commodity lottery’ the 
winners seemed to be areas that had little or no arable land. The geographical position 
and the lack of arable land in places like Venice, Genova, and the Dutch Republic had 
forced the inhabitants into making a living from manufacturing and trading. However, 
the nations that had drawn worse lots – for example, rather counterintuitively having 
much arable land – could compensate for that disadvantage through conscious economic 
policies, to which Serra (1613) devotes a whole chapter. It is clear that much early 
economic theory indeed was born, as a reaction to this lottery, in the poor countries that 
tried to emulate the productive structures of the wealthier areas of Europe (Reinert 
2004b). Their strategic geographical positions and the lack of arable land had made 
Venice and the Dutch Republic wealthy by creating an industrial system with a huge 
division of labour. Other countries could create copies of these wealth-producing 
                                                 
7   This discussion is based on Viano (2006).   7
economic structures by promoting the same kind of activities found there. This required 
conscious economic policies, among them tariffs. 
The forces of Fate and Providence could thus be counteracted by wise economic 
policies. It is crucial to understand, however, that such economic policies, ever since 
Henry VII’s successful industrialisation of England (Reinert 1996), initially – and 
sometimes for centuries – required making a less efficient copy of the productive 
structure observed in the leading nations (Reinert 2004b). This required tariffs. A key 
objective of economic policies was for centuries to achieve the right balance between 
agriculture, manufacturing, and trade – activities that were seen as being qualitatively 
different – that would maximize human welfare. Even with the advantage of lower 
wages enjoyed by poor nations in competing for world markets, the dynamics of 
learning, technology, scale and market sizes made it impossible to catch up with the 
‘naturally rich’ nations like Venice and the Dutch Republic without some kind of 
‘artificial’ support of the targeted industries. Only by creating production units that from 
a business point of view initially were less efficient than those of the leading countries, 
laggard nations could raise their standard of living. Thus, in the short term the interests 
of the nation’s inhabitants as consumers were sacrificed in the interest of the same 
inhabitants as producers. When the desired economic structure had been achieved, it 
was clear to all that the increased level of income more than compensated for the 
increased price level. Through economic policy nations without the natural and 
geographical advantages of Venice and the Dutch Republic were able to catch up with 
these leaders. Their toolbox for catching up has now essentially been outlawed by the 
‘conditionalities’ of the Washington Institutions. 
However, the timing of this protection was crucial: the same institution that in one 
context would cause increased welfare would, in another context, decrease welfare. 
Once a certain domestic industrial capacity was reached, access to larger markets was 
deemed more important than continuing protection: ‘tariffs’, as an anonymous Italian 
political economist travelling in Holland observed, ‘are as useful for introducing the arts 
in a country, as they are damaging once these are established’ (Anonymous 1786: 31). 
In this framework economic development is activity-specific: intimately tied to 
diversified economic structures that both individually and as a whole are subject to 
dynamic increasing returns. Institutions therefore become context specific, the same 
institutions that are appropriate in one context may become totally inappropriate in 
another. As we shall discuss later, in a technologically dynamic system institutional 
unlearning becomes as important as institutional learning and – as Chang points out in 
this UNU-WIDER project – an institution like property rights cannot be regarded as 
‘something good in itself’. Context is again the key. There can be both ‘too much’ and 
‘too little’ property rights, as well as institutional perversion, as we shall see under the 
discussion of patents. 
Institutions, then, are only fully comprehensible as they relate to a future goal to be 
achieved. In this evolutionary world view, the economy is not on its way to any 
equilibrium, but rather towards some future optimum that is never reached, because the 
dynamics of new knowledge and technology continuously change both the present and 
the prospects for the future. In the activistic-idealistic tradition this goal is economic 
progress or economic development. Both in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries this 
progress was generally seen as moving through qualitatively different stages (see 
Appendix 2), e.g. from a hunting and gathering society to a pastoral society to an   8
agricultural society to a society based on handicraft, and finally through an industrial 
society (Ely 1903; Meek 1976; Reinert 2000a). It was obvious to all that an industrial 
society would create a higher standard of living than a hunting and gathering society. 
Institutions were tools from which this progress from one stage to another was crafted, 
and their dynamics had to be understood in the context of the productive structure. 
This tradition contrasts with the passivistic-materialistic tradition. Starting with Adam 
Smith, three methodological innovations evolved – peaking with the work of David 
Ricardo – creating a fundamental change in the nature of economics. 
1.  Production and trade were unified and converted into ‘labour’ (Biernacki 1995: 
252).  
2.  Society as a unit of analysis disappeared in favour of ‘methodological 
individualism’: With this the synergetic elements disappeared and private rate of 
return became identical with societal rate of return.  
3.  Inventions and innovations were exogenised from the economic theory. 
 
Collectively, these assumptions radically changed economics in a variety of ways: first 
of all, in this theory all economic activities became qualitatively alike as carriers of 
economic activities (‘the equality assumption’). Markets thus became institutions that 
automatically created harmony. A major innovation brought by this kind of economic 
theory was that, for the first time, colonialism became morally defensible (Reinert and 
Reinert 2005). Previously it had been clear to most social scientists that the key element 
of colonialism – prohibiting the establishment of manufacturing – was tantamount to 
poverty.  
With Adam Smith the metaphor on which the science of economics was based also 
changed. Since Roman Law the basic metaphor in understanding society had been the 
human body, where synergies are obvious. When the basic metaphor for economics 
became physics-based – either with the invisible hand that kept the social system 
together or later with equilibrium physics – the need for institutions in order to oil the 
machinery of progress disappeared. Since its conception with Adam Smith, an 
important hallmark of laissez-faire theory has therefore been its neglect of institutions. 
Harvard economic historian Thomas McCraw puts it this way: ‘Smith exhibits a 
powerful aesthetic aversion to any type of collective action, a visceral distaste bordering 
on revulsion. For him, ‘“human institutions” so invariably produce “absurd” results that 
they have no presumptive legitimacy’ (McCraw 1992: 364).  
In the activist-idealist tradition that sprung from the Renaissance, power and politics 
were an integrated part of economic reasoning. Feudalism was a political system that 
had to be fought in order to create the desired economic structures. From thirteenth 
century Florence via Henry VII in 1485 to Korea of the 1960s containment of the 
political power of the landed oligarchy has been a part of the process of economic 
development.  
What Chang appropriately calls a ‘fatalist’ bias in today’s mainstream argument is born 
with the passivistic-materialist tradition. In Adam Smith, it is Providence – not power or 
politics – that has created the distribution of land. The same Providence, however, has – 
through its invisible hand – also wisely limited human beings’ possibility for   9
consumption and pleasure in a way that gives virtually the same level of happiness to 
rich and poor alike:  
The rich ... are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of 
the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided 
into equal portions among all its inhabitants... When Providence divided the 
earth among a few lordly masters, it neither forgot nor abandoned those who 
seemed to have been left out in the partition. These last too enjoy their share of 
all that it produces. In what constitutes the real happiness of human life, they are 
in no respect inferior to those who would seem so much above them. In ease of 
body and peace of mind, all the different ranks of life are nearly upon a level, 
and the beggar, who suns himself by the side of the highway, possesses that 
security which kings are fighting for. (Smith 1759/1812: 318-19) 
By exogenising the factors that create both economic development and any qualitative 
difference between economic activities, this type of economic theory becomes a system 
of automatic economic harmony. The elements causing this economic harmony are 
essentially built into the basic assumptions of the theory itself. Still, when the real world 
refuses to behave like the model predicts, these assumptions are rarely discussed. 
Instead, Fate and Providence are brought back in.8 The parallel movements that we are 
witnessing in mainstream economics today – exit policies and entry Providence and 
Millennium Goals – are all logically connected. Chronologically the sequence is this: 
(1) A harmony-creating theory is built where no policies are necessary (the neo-classical 
synthesis). (2) This model fails to deliver on its promises. (3) Instead of looking for the 
solution to this discrepancy between theory and reality inside the logical structure of the 
standard model itself (where it is actually found), external factors like climate, Faith and 
Providence are brought back. (4) Due to a complete lack of qualitative understanding of 
economic development as an industrial system, the symptoms rather than the causes of 
poverty are attacked through the Millennium Goals (Reinert 2005b). 
Institutions and the return of Providence: geography, climate and disease 
An important element in today’s debate on development is that the people who were in 
charge of implementing the destructive policies of the 1990s – people like Jeffrey Sachs 
– are still in power, now as gurus of what we could call the ‘Geography, Climate and 
Disease School of Poverty’ (see Evans 2006). The fact that we in reality have put Attila 
the Hun in change of the reconstruction of Rome means (a) that we shall not have a 
discussion on what went wrong and caused the destruction in the first place, and (b) we 
shall not have a discussion that questions the logic of standard textbook economics. In 
the same way that the collapse of the first wave of globalisation led economists into 
eugenics or racial hygiene (Ross 1998), today’s problems in the periphery are explained 
in ways that fail to address the problems of standard economics itself. Mainstream 
economic discourse from climate and disease to the Millennium Goals functions as a 
giant (and very successful) cover-up for past mistakes. It is almost as if the drastic fall 
in living standards since the inception of the Washington Consensus – from Argentina 
to Mongolia – were results of climatic changes rather than changes in the framework for 
                                                 
8   See also Viner (1972) for a discussion of this.   10
economic policy. Instead of climate and geography, the understanding of industrial 
systems, Schumpeterian institutions, and technological change should be brought into 
development economics.  
In the activistic-idealistic tradition of economics – The Other Canon – the roots of 
poverty lie in the productive structure of poor nations: a domination of resource-based 
monoculture under diminishing returns, and a lack of division of labour, diversity, 
synergies and increasing returns. At the core of the self-reinforcing mechanisms of 
economic development lies increasing returns (Arthur 1989). Jump-starting increasing 
returns activities (generally manufacturing) has been a mandatory passage point for all 
presently rich countries. The key problem today is that the institutional tools these 
countries used historically have now essentially been outlawed through free trade 
agreements and conditionalities imposed by the Washington institutions. In the 
alternative Other Canon tradition, a colonial economic structure – specialising in 
diminishing return activities – was a key element in the poverty trap. What may initially 
have been a climatic condition – Providence – rapidly became a question of policy and 
politics: the nations where the settlers came in order to exploit raw materials specialized 
according to the vested interest of the settlers in ‘colonial’ products. In nations with a 
large number of settlers – generally in temperate climates – they rapidly passed laws 
and regulations promoting manufacturing industries. Where both types of settlers were 
present – like in the US – these conflicts became a political dividing line that 
contributed to a civil war. From this point of view, Latin America is a group of 
countries where the ‘South’ won the civil war. 
Largely ignoring history, the Geography, Climate and Disease School of Poverty tends 
to confuse symptoms of poverty with causes of poverty as mentioned above. The focus 
on malaria is a case in point. For centuries malaria was endemic to large parts of 
Europe. Malaria has been found as far north as the Kola Peninsula in Northern Russia. 
In the upper Rhine valley at 1,400 m above sea level in Switzerland – today an unlikely 
place for malaria – the disease ran rampant up to a few hundred years ago. Slowly 
malaria was virtually eradicated in Europe through a combined process of economic 
development and public sanitation. Stagnant water is not only potentially unhealthy, it is 
also unprofitable. To get the water running was needed for irrigation, for navigation, 
and for power supply. Expanding urban areas required unproductive land to be drained 
in order to increase food supply, while at the same time the general progress created 
both the possibility and the attitude behind sanitation projects. Economic development 
killed malaria, not mosquito nets as with today’s Millennium Development Goals. 
The presently dominating view, promoted by the Washington institutions, that the 
quality of the Third World institutions is an important reason why their prescribed 
policies failed, represents – in my opinion – to a large extent a reversal of the arrows of 
causality in the process of economic growth. Good institutions seem to require a certain 
type of economic soil in order to grow in a healthy way. ‘High-quality states’ have 
hardly ever been created without significant artisansal and manufacturing urban sectors, 
where the rule of law and slowly also democracy achieved their first footholds. Good 
institutions and good governance as economic growth itself appear to be activity-
specific, to require the presence of increasing return activities and a large division of 
labour. Institutions and economic activities clearly co-evolve – the arrows of causality 
necessarily move in both directions – but presently one of the two directions appears to 
be overwhelmingly overrated.   11
Institution-building and development: co-evolution and the direction of arrows of 
causality 
This section looks at how the question of causality between institutional change and 
productive structures has been evaluated by social scientists. In my opinion the virtually 
unanimous consensus across Europe from very early on was that – in spite of obvious 
elements of co-evolution – institution-building in its fundamental nature was a demand-
pull phenomenon, that the mode of production of a society would mould, shape and 
determine its institutions.  
‘Industry molds people’ is the title of a 1929 book, recently reprinted (Kautz c.1929). 
Industrialization changed attitudes and institutions, changes that would have been 
impossible in the absence of that industrialization. Feudal societies cannot have the 
institutions of industrial societies, so human attitudes and institutions are more a product 
of their mode of production than the other way around. As Thorstein Veblen puts it: 
it may be said that institutions are of the nature of prevalent habits of thought, 
and that therefore the force which shapes institutions is the force or forces which 
shape the habits of thought prevalent in the community. But habits of thought are 
the outcome of the habits of life. Whether it is intentionally directed to the 
education of the individual or not, the discipline of daily life acts to alter or 
reinforce the received habits of thought, and so acts to alter or fortify the 
received institutions under which men live. And the direction in which, on the 
whole, the alteration proceeds is conditioned by the trend of the discipline of 
daily life. (Veblen 1961: 314) 
In 1620 Francis Bacon formulated a view that was to dominate in the social sciences for 
centuries: ‘There is a startling difference between the life of men in the most civilised 
provinces of Europe, and in the wildest and most barbarous districts of New India. This 
difference comes not from the soil, not from climate, not from race, but from the arts’. 
Francis Bacon is clear on the causality in question: Man’s activities – his modes of 
production – determine his institutions.
9 Further geographical discoveries were only to 
reinforce this view. William Robertson’s The History of America (1777) emphasizes 
Bacon’s point: ‘In every inquiry concerning the operations of men when united together 
in society, the first object of attention should be their mode of subsistence. Accordingly 
as that varies, their laws and policies must be different’ (Reinert 2000a). This mode-of-
production-demand view of institutions is in my view strongly at odds with the present 
World Bank view, where institutions per se – freed from any understanding of the 
system of production – are supposed to solve problems of development. 
Subsequent insights only reinforced this same view: pre-agricultural societies, be they 
Andean tribes or Norwegian Sámi, tended to have similar institutional arrangements. 
Later development into agriculture required fundamentally new institutions, in the same 
way as did the later process of industrialization. Today, in the theories of Carlota Perez, 
each new techno-economic paradigm again requires new sets of institutions and a new 
set of organizational common sense (see Appendix 3). The stage theories of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, mentioned above, are expressions of an activity-
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specific view of institutions. Starting already around 1500, the primary focus in 
development policy would be to establish the particular economic activities that were 
seen to create growth. In turn, the targeted economic activities would create a demand 
for useful institutions. By looking at institutions per se, outside the context of the 
productive system, crucial factors involving demand, knowledge, synergies and 
cumulative causations are excluded. 
When Johan Jacob Meyen, a German scientist, in 1769 stated ‘It is known that a 
primitive people does not improve its customs and institutions, later to find useful 
industries, but the other way around’ (Reinert 2000b), he expressed an understanding of 
causality that was considered common sense at the time. In the Communist Manifesto 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels follow the same line of reasoning: technical change 
brought on by manufacturing is the driving force of change; it is manufacturing that 
rescued people from what they call the idiocy (isolation/stasis) of rural life: 
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by 
the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most 
barbarian, nations into civilization … The bourgeoisie has subjected the country 
to the rule of the towns. It has created enormous cities, has greatly increased the 
urban population as compared with the rural, and has thus rescued a considerable 
part of the population from the idiocy of rural life. 
This view – that the mode of production brings with it changes – appears to run counter 
to the standard World Bank view that the lack of institutions per se can be blamed for 
the poor performance of so many Third World countries. To early modern ‘mercantilist’ 
writers it would not be meaningful to attempt to understand the institutional 
development of Europe independent of the underlying strategy of industrialization that 
prompted the establishment of so many key institutions. As already mentioned, the 
patent system was invented in Venice in the late 1400s with this purpose, and the 
establishment of an apprentice system in England under Elizabeth I cannot be 
understood outside the context of a highly successful Tudor strategy of building English 
woollen manufactures during the 1500s. The establishment of countless scientific 
academies in the 1700s all over Europe must also be understood as part of a strategy to 
establish economic activities outside the agricultural sector. The success of these 
diversification strategies in turn created new institutional arrangements.  
‘Mercantilist’ institutions (see Appendix 1) cannot be understood outside a context of 
nations seeking to escape a comparative advantage in producing raw materials. We 
would argue that the present focus on institutions tends to see them statically and 
context-free rather than as parts of a complex dynamic link of causality of economic 
development. In reality a large number of these institutions are part of a much broader 
process of economic development that is incompatible with the internal logic of present 
mainstream economics. Seeing institutions independently of the productive system they 
support and sustain is not meaningful. Attempting to establish scientific academies in 
hunting and gathering tribes is therefore attacking the problem from the wrong end. 
History shows that only societies that have achieved a certain level of manufacturing 
and/or other increasing return activities have ever achieved the ‘right’ institutions or 
any degree of ‘competitiveness’. Hundreds of years of accumulated experience show 
that today’s maxim ‘get the institutions right’ cannot be solved independently of ‘get 
into the right kind of economic activities’.   13
Historically, we can often observe that the economic activity establishing a demand for 
the institution in question would appear before the institution itself. A ‘reverse salient’ 
that hindered the evolution of the system was solved by establishing a new institution. 
Insurance was created as the result of high-risk camel caravans and other long distance 
trading. The caravans and the ocean trade were there long before the important 
institution of insurance, and without these high-risk ventures such institutions are much 
less likely to evolve. Banking was created in the Italian city-states, where certain 
economic activities created a demand for such institutions, and introducing banking in a 
society which is not ripe for such institutions is unlikely to have much beneficial effect 
and may therefore easily fail. Over the centuries, manufacturing industries in particular 
were seen as a necessary ingredient in creating the most desirable institutions, including 
political freedom. Beneficial institutions were, to some extent, seen as unintended 
secondary effects of establishing certain types of economic activities. 
It can be argued that even as late as after the Second World War – with the Marshall 
Plan to reindustrialize Europe –the ‘technology of institution building’ in terms of 
creating wealth was based on targeting the kind of activities that would bring the right 
kinds of institutions, not the other way around. Also, particularly since the 1870s, the 
distributive institutions aimed at solving the social problems brought by industrialisation 
were systematically and consciously created by accumulation of case studies by the 
German Verein für Sozialpolitik (1872-1932). German institution-building for a welfare 
state played a key role for all of Europe. 
German economist Karl Diehl (1941) used a piece by Swedish playwright August 
Strindberg to discuss the relationship between modes of production and economic 
institutions, reaffirming the tradition from Francis Bacon to Montesquieu that 
institutions are determined by the mode of production, and that it is not really 
constructive to attempt reversing the arrow of causality. In Strindberg’s novel De 
lycksaligas  ö (‘The island of the blissful’) a group of eighteenth century Swedish 
convicts, including two young students who had insulted the King, experience a 
sequence of Robinson Crusoe type shipwrecks on their way to a far-away colony that 
they never reach (Strindberg 1882/1913). Led by the students, the convicts – by now 
free from any authority – establish their own society and consciously discuss the 
abolishment or establishment of the institutions they are used to at home. While at the 
most tropical of the islands visited, they decide to abolish most of the known 
institutions. You need no inheritance law if you walk around naked and harvest the 
fruits of the earth, they argue. When, after a second shipwreck, they reach an island with 
a more temperate climate, they discover that their new life-style requires the 
reintroduction of institutions that they had previously abandoned as useless. August 
Strindberg shows us Francis Bacon’s point: an institutional system is mainly moulded 
around the needs determined by the mode of production, not the other way around. 
Having lost a qualitative type of understanding which can only be achieved by 
understanding production, rather than just barter and trade, neo-classical economics has 
lost this connection between production and institutions: the activity-specific element of 
institutional development which for centuries was commonly known to social scientists. 
This loss is much to the detriment of many developing countries today. Thus, we would 
argue that the problem of ‘failed states’ and their institutional failures cannot 
meaningfully be discussed independently of the kind of economic activities in which 
these states engage.   14
The fundamental insight behind the 1947 Marshall Plan was that economic activities 
were qualitatively different, those of the countryside (which we could call diminishing 
returns activities, or agriculture) differed from those of the cities (which we could call 
increasing returns activities, or industry). In his famous speech at Harvard, US Secretary 
of State George Marshall stressed that ‘the farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to 
exchange with the city dweller for the other necessities of life’. This division of labour, 
i.e. between increasing returns activities in the cities and diminishing returns activities 
in the countryside, was ‘at the present time…threatened with breakdown’. George 
Marshall then made a remarkable recognition of the cameralist and mercantilist 
economic policy of previous centuries: ‘This division of labor is the basis of modern 
civilization’.  Civilisation requires increasing returns activities, something that 
economists and politicians from Antonio Serra (1613) to Alexander Hamilton (1791) 
and Friedrich List (1841) had already been saying for centuries. We suggest that 
historical institution-building again needs to be seen in this light. 
Historically institution-building has been intimately tied to strategies of learning and 
change, of changing the economic fabric of a society, a way of thinking not easily 
captured within a neo-classical laissez-faire framework. In 1404 the magistrates of 
Bruges, in Flanders, requested the magistrates of Barcelona to inform them what the 
common practice was in regard to bills of exchange (Beckmann 1797: Vol. 3, p. 482). 
This is an example of a conscious attempt to import an institution in order to increase 
production and trade in their city. Studying institutions per se in an equilibrium 
framework, outside the context of the desired process of change, is in our view 
generally not meaningful. Likewise, we would argue that it is not meaningful to study 
institutions divorced from the historical setting that made the desired change feasible. 
For example, it will probably be impossible to recreate an institution born with great 
effort in industrial Europe in an African hunting and gathering tribe. Institutional 
change must therefore be seen, as traditionally it has been, in a dynamic context of 
technological change where different economic activities, operating in a system of 
synergy, are seen as playing different roles, demanding and creating very different 
institutional frameworks.  
Different theories and different types of institutions: Hayekian and Schumpeterian 
One prevalent part of what we have come to call ‘the Enlightenment project’ was 
ordering the world by creating taxonomies or classification systems, of which that of 
Linnaeus is the best known. The analytical accuracy of neo-classical economics, on the 
other hand, is essentially a product of a lack of taxonomies, of what Nobel laureate 
James Buchanan calls ‘the equality assumption’. The assumption that all economic 
activities are qualitatively alike leads to Paul Samuelson’s factor-price equalization. Just 
a simple taxonomy of economic activities being of two kinds – those subject to 
increasing and those subject to diminishing returns – automatically invalidates the 
theory of factor-price equalisation, and creates a system where one nation in practice 
may specialise in being poor. This absence of a taxonomy is thus intimately tied to 
mainstream’s perceived lack of need for policies and for institutions. 
In economics Friedrich von Hayek and Joseph Alois Schumpeter have given their 
names to two types of entrepreneurs. It seems potentially useful to create another simple 
taxonomy based on the same criteria for the purpose of understanding the role of   15
institutions in economic development in a neo-classical versus in an evolutionary/ 
Schumpeterian framework. 
The  Hayekian entrepreneur is someone who creates more perfect markets and 
equilibrium because he adds or creates nothing new. This is done essentially by 
arbitrage. A nice example of this type of entrepreneurship was given by my marketing 
professor Jim Heskett at Harvard Business School. Professor Heskett’s pet business idea 
was based on the observation that in England brown eggs commanded a premium price 
over white eggs, while in the United States the situation was reversed: white eggs were 
more expensive than brown eggs. Heskett’s subsequent plan to hire a jumbo jet to carry 
white eggs from England to the United States, and bring brown eggs back to England is 
a typical example of Hayekian entrepreneurship, an equilibrium-producing initiative. 
In contrast, the Schumpeterian entrepreneur is a driving force in history, a producer 
who pushes forward the never-ending frontier of knowledge by introducing innovations. 
There are a few individuals who are notorious routine-breakers, but these few force the 
other companies in the same business either to follow the same path or perish. The 
dynamics of capitalism is produced by these routine-breaking entrepreneurs and firms: 
innovation is necessary to survive. As one of the figures in Alice in Wonderland says, 
‘this is how fast you have to run here in order to stand still’. The corresponding saying 
in the world of business is ‘this is how fast you have to innovate in order to keep your 
profits stable’. 
Neo-classical economics produces a simple, calculable and quantifiable static economic 
theory that only needs Hayekian equilibrium-oiling institutions. The second type of 
theory, of a much more complex Man, also needs a much more complex and dynamic 
theory, the core of which is irreducible to numbers and symbols.10 The first view of 
Man calls for what Sombart named an ordnende economic theory (i.e. organizing 
without a qualitative understanding), while the second calls for a verstehende economic 
theory, that is, an ‘appreciative’ theory in Nelson and Winter’s terminology (Sombart 
1930). Insights from anthropology are very useful in such ‘appreciative’ theory. Not by 
coincidence Thorstein Veblen and Karl Polanyi (1944) – two main contributors to the 
study of institutions – both belong to the very small group of economists who received 
much of their inspiration from anthropology, probably the least quantifiable and most 
verstehende of all the social sciences. 
It will be clear from this analysis that I consider most of the ‘new’ institutional school to 
fall in the framework of Hayekian institutions, but not necessarily all. Douglas North’s 
statement that ‘The central issue of economic history and of economic development is 
to account for the evolution of political and economic institutions that create an 
economic environment that induces increasing productivity’ (North 1991: 98) may be 
seen as approaching a Schumpeterian view of institutions. However, the stress on 
‘increasing productivity’ rather than on inventions, innovation, novelty, and structural 
change reveals a neo-classical rather than a Schumpeterian conception of growth and 
development. 
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Institutions as roadblocks to change: institutional inertia, institutional overdoses 
and institutional perversions 
Just as they may open the path for Schumpeterian creative destruction, institutions may 
– if they have been created in order to further an old order to be destroyed – function as 
roadblocks for change. Karl Marx and Thorstein Veblen both discuss institutional 
inertia as such roadblocks impeding change. As Carlota Perez (2004) argues, 
fundamentally new technologies require not only new institutions; they simultaneously 
require and develop a new type of organizational common sense (see Appendix 3). The 
slow speed of institutional unlearning hinders technological change. Feudalist 
institutions hindered industrialization, and had to be demolished. Similarly Thorstein 
Veblen – that quintessential institutional economist – argued that new technologies 
spread better in new environments where old institutions do not hold them back. This is 
clearly an important mechanism that explains why periods of radical technological 
change are also periods when new nations – uninhibited by institutions that preserve the 
old order – are able to leapfrog into world leadership. 
It is natural that the observation of institutional inertia serving as a roadblock to further 
development will appear in periods with radical technological change, in the transition 
period between techno-economic paradigms. The timing of the references of Marx, 
Nietzsche, Veblen and Perez/Freeman all testify to this. 
This same type of argument is often used to explain why immigrants tend to be more 
entrepreneurial than locals: they are unbound by the existing institutional framework in 
their new country. Again, with Veblen the activities themselves tend to push the 
institutional change, not the other way around. The technology of institution-building 
must therefore, in our view, be deeply integrated into Leonardo Bruni’s question from 
1413: the question of why it was instituted. A failure to do this leads down today’s 
slippery slope where mainstream policy-making seems to indicate that what African 
hunting and gathering tribes need are better property rights rather than a different 
production structure. 
Also Friedrich Nietzsche describes, in a quite poetic way, an institutional inertia where 
ideas come first and only slowly are able to change institutions: ‘The overthrow of 
institutions does not follow immediately upon the overthrow of opinions, instead, the 
new opinions live for a long time in the desolate and strangely unfamiliar house of their 
predecessors and even preserve it themselves, since they need some sort of shelter’ 
(Nietzsche 2000: 4,708).
11 
Technological dynamics requires that institutions be seen dynamically as they relate to 
changes in the productive sectors. In this context institutions must be understood as 
context-specific tools in a setting where economic development is activity-specific and 
where the factor bias of economic development changes over time. A changing factor-
bias of economic development means that some economic periods need one factor of 
production more intensely than other periods, as for example, the age of railways was 
relatively intensive in the use of capital. This would in turn change the institutional 
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requirements of one era from those of another. It is also possible that institutions that are 
productive and legitimate in a certain dose may – in a larger dose – become either 
unproductive or illegitimate or both. Institutional overdoses are entirely possible, and 
they may bring with them a perversion of the institution as compared to its original 
intent.  
The Inca Empire, or Tahuantinsuyu, is the largest society known to have functioned 
without the use of money, with an estimated 12 million inhabitants ranging from the 
north of present-day Chile to the south of Columbia, including large parts of Bolivia, 
Peru and Ecuador. In a society without money, taxes are paid by working a certain 
number of days a year for the community. In many countries military conscription 
represents to this very day this type of tax-by-labour. In the Inca Empire this tax 
institution was known as the mita (Murra 1978). In a year with 365 days, 36.5 days of 
work per year would represent a tax rate of 10 per cent. 
When the Spanish arrived and needed labour for the mines, they extended the mita to 
what in effect became slavery. This is an early example of how legitimate institutions 
are used in a way that makes them ethically illegitimate. Today the changes taking place 
in the fifteenth century institution of patents may be not only be comparable to the 
‘illegitimate’ change in the Inca institution of mita, but also be unproductive in the 
sense that the institutions of patents in some cases may hinder rather than foster 
innovations (Perelman 2002). 
There are examples of too broad patents previously awarded being revoked because 
they blocked further innovations.12 Today, allowing patents to move upstream from 
products to e.g. genes may block rather than promote further research. This is a case of 
‘institutional perversion’ similar to one observed by Adam Smith. At the time of 
Smith’s writing, the institution of patents in England had clearly partly become 
perverted. Instead of supporting innovations, the kings would sell monopolies in order 
to finance expensive wars. In this way patents become vehicles of static rent-seeking 
rather than of dynamic Schumpeterian rent-seeking as they were supposed to.  
In 1943 the Supreme Court of the United States held the broad claims of Guglielmo 
Marconi’s patent for improvements in apparatus for wireless telegraphy to be invalid. In 
a similar way, the Wright brothers were granted a patent by the US Patent Office in 
1906 for a flying machine. An array of patent litigations was to follow. This ended only 
with the advent of the First World War when the aircraft manufacturers formed a patent 
pool with the approval of the US government, causing all patent litigation to cease 
automatically (Perelman 2002). In the new knowledge-based economy, the 
encroachment of patents into the areas closest to the frontier of knowledge makes 
catching-up through reverse engineering – a common tool for catching up under Fordist 
mass production – increasingly impossible. This is no doubt an issue that will grow in 
importance in the years to come. 
Some institutions importantly serve dual, multiple, and systemic purposes. 
Industrialization, adding manufacturing activities to a nation, was argued for from the 
point of view of increasing employment, increasing wages, increasing taxes, reducing 
the deficit in the balances of trade and payment, and as a means to increase the velocity 
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of circulation of money (Reinert and Reinert 2005). Indeed, industrialization was seen 
as the nucleus of the virtuous circles of growth and development. Customs duties for a 
long time played the dual role of creating fiscal income and industrialization. This 
combination was particularly important in weak nations in the economic periphery, as in 
Latin America, where the ports were one of the few areas that the state fully controlled. 
Going back to the original sources, not a minimal doubt exists that a primary purpose of 
import duties after 1485 was a strategy to change the economic structure of a nation 
rather than increasing fiscal income. This was also the case in England, where the whole 
debate around ‘good’ and ‘bad’ trade amply testifies to this (King 1721). If the original 
intention of patents had been to increase fiscal income, it would have been much easier 
to tax the consumption of luxuries rather than inventing something as far-fetched as 
protecting inventions later to sell them as monopolies. 
Conclusion: bringing production and institutions back together 
Long before the 1532 arrival of the Spaniards in Peru, Nicolas Oresme – in his 1355 
treatise on the invention of money – complains about another kind of institutional 
perversion: that money is no longer used only as it was intended (Oresme c.1355/1956). 
Too much money was hoarded as treasure rather than being used in order to foment 
trade and production, which was the reason money had been invented in the first place. 
Both the Leonardo Bruni 1413 quote at the start of this paper and Oresme’s insistence 
on how consciously institutions were made in order to achieve specific dynamic 
economic goals should stand as an example leading us away from the static neo-
classical view of institutions and into the rediscovery of the ‘ancient’ and dynamic 
institutional school of economics. Here we find an extremely rich literature, covering 
close to 800 years, on the dynamic role of institutions and production working together 
to create economic growth and welfare. 
I have argued that around the fifteenth century this ‘ancient’ institutional school 
acquired a dynamic and Schumpeterian character, emphasizing innovations and 
structural change. Rather than classifying institutional schools by their age, this paper 
has suggested a different taxonomy: A clearer distinction between institutions that 
facilitate and lubricate the neo-classical machinery on its path towards equilibrium – 
Hayekian Institutions – and the institutions that create new knowledge and 
entrepreneurial opportunities – Schumpeterian institutions – might help creating a 
separate vocabulary for evolutionary/Schumpeterian economics that facilitates the 
reconstruction of a theoretical edifice distinct from that of mainstream textbook 
economics. In order to do this, it is necessary to put not only the study of institutions 
back to the core of economics, but also how these institutions affect the dynamics of 
changing modes of production, much as these two elements were combined in the 
writings of Thorstein Veblen. 
The people who in the late 1400s established both patents (in order to make it profitable 
to create new knowledge) and dynamic tariffs (in order to resettle newly created 
knowledge and technologies in new nations) obviously had a very clear model of 
economic development in their heads: a model where the creation and diffusion of new 
knowledge were at the core of an economic strategy creating wealth. Patents and tariffs, 
when used for this purpose, are typically Schumpeterian institutions. When Adam Smith 
later exogenized the production of knowledge, and to a large extent also production   19
itself, from economic theory, economics became catalectics – a science of exchange – 
and new institutionalism rarely ventures beyond the study of the institutions needed for 
this exchange to take place and those needed to protect property. These I have called 
Hayekian institutions.  
What is so serious about today’s situation is that mainstream economics – with 
catalectics at its very core – generally refuses to acknowledge that institutionalism other 
than their own ‘new’ institutionalism possesses a theory. We are, as I see it, back to the 
perennial fault lines in the economics profession. Ronald Coase’s dismissal of ‘old’ 
institutionalism is typical: ‘Without a theory they had nothing to pass on except a mass 
of descriptive material waiting for a theory, or a fire’ (Coase 1984: 230). The 
mainstream is back to Ricardo’s view that if their doctrines don’t tally with the facts 
that is just ‘so much worse for the facts’ (Ferguson 1938: 142). In this spirit, solutions to 
the poverty problems of today are not sought were they are to be found – in the 
application of inappropriate models of standard textbook economics – but outside 
economics, in the realm of Providence, climate, disease, and geography. 
‘The literature is curiously void of attempts to relate the problems of development and 
underdevelopment and the facts of international inequality to the theory of international 
trade’ said Gunnar Myrdal (1956: 12). By understanding capitalism as Werner Sombart 
did, as (1) the entrepreneur, (2) the modern state, and (3) the industrial system, and 
coupling this to present trade flows, the mechanism creating and distributing wealth and 
poverty will be unveiled. However, Adam Smith’s reduction of production and trade to 
a common unity of ‘labour’ – thereby leaving out the study of production – continues to 
haunt the economics profession as a nemesis. Therefore peripheral factors like climate, 
geography and disease are brought back to the core of mainstream development 
economics. Here the belief in the invisible hand of the market is only overshadowed by 
a primitive belief in Fate and Providence. These, however, only win the day because the 
policy instruments that historically have subjugated Fate and Providence by creating 
industrial systems are today outlawed by the Washington institutions. 
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Appendix 1. Institutions and policies of Schumpeterian mercantilism 
Promoting and Protecting New Knowledge in the Economic Policy  
of the Renaissance 
The Establishment of Scientific Academies 
—  Bacon’s ‘New Atlantis’: Salomon’s House. 
—  Leibniz: Inspires the establishment of the academies of Berlin, Vienna,  
and St Petersburg. 
Encouragement and Assistance to Inventors 
—  Bacon: ‘Upon every invention of value we erect a statue to the inventor,  
and give him a liberal and honourable reward’. (Bacon 1930: 272). 
—  Christian Wolff: ‘We should forbid mockery of inventors’. 
Diffusion of new Knowledge/Education 
—  Bacon: ‘We have circuits of visits, of divers principal cities of the kingdom; 
where as it cometh to pass we do publish
13 such new profitable inventions  
as we think good. 
—  Wolff as the ‘educator of the German Nation’. 
Establishing an Apprentice System  
—  In England under Elizabeth I (1533-1603) 
—  In Germany as a result of the teachings of Leibniz and Wolff. 
Patent Protection for New Inventions (Venice, fifteenth century) 
—  Showing a sophisticated understanding of the appropriability problem of new 
knowledge. 
State-owned Manufactures as ‘Places of Learning’ 
—  Emphasized by Werner Sombart.  
Subsidies to Firms in Industries new to the Nation or Region, maximising the Division 
of Labour 
—  Serra: the number of different professions as a key factor in explaining  
the wealth of a city. 
                                                 
13   ‘Publish’ here in its meaning of ‘to make generally accessible, to disseminate, offer to the public’ 
(Oxford English Dictionary, Vl. VIII, pp. 1561-62.)   21
Tax Breaks and Bounties to Firms bringing in New Technology 
—  Systematically applied in England, starting under Henry VII in 1485. 
—  Import of skilled labour. 
Travel Restrictions for Skilled Labour 
—  Under penalty of death for certain skills in Venice. 
Prohibition against the Export of Machinery 
—  In force in England until the 1830s. 
Prohibition against the Use of Machinery in the Colonies 
—  The heritage of this economic policy is still felt in many Third World countries 
which, like Haiti, are specialised in the economic activities which have not yet 
been mechanised. 
Export Duties on Raw Materials 
—  ensuring that local manufacturing industries have lower prices on raw 
materials than foreign competitors. 
Import Duties on manufactured Goods, while national Competition insured 
—  machines seen as a proxy for new knowledge, this measure maximises the flow 
of capital and labour to activities producing with machines, not manual power. 
Strengthening the Navy 
—  taking advantage of ‘the economies of scale in the use of force’ (Frederic 
Lane). 
 
Source: Reinert (1999) 
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Appendix 2. The Economic Stages 
From the 
Standpoint of 
Production 
From Bücher’s 
Standpoint 
From Hildebrand’s 
Standpoint 
From the Labour 
Standpoint 
From Giddens’s 
Standpoint 
1. Hunting and 
Fishing 
Luck 
Magic 
2. Pastoral 
Slaughter of 
Enemies, 
Woman’s Labour, 
and Beginning of 
Slavery 
 
Sacrificial 
3. Agricultural 
 
 
Independent 
Domestic 
Economy 
 
 
 
Truck 
Economy 
Slavery and 
Serfdom 
Slave 
Labour 
4. Handicraft  Town 
Economy 
Money 
Economy 
Free Labour 
governed by 
Custom 
 
Trade 
5. Industrial 
(1) Universal 
Competition as 
an ideal 
(2) Concentration 
(3) Integration 
 
National 
Economy 
 
 
(World 
Economy) 
 
 
Credit 
Economy 
Individual 
Contract with 
Increasing 
Regulation by 
Statute 
Group Contract 
and Regulation by 
Statute 
 
 
 
 
 
Capitalistic 
Source: Ely (1903), Reinert (2000a). Ely himself adds ‘World Economy’ to Bücher’s system.   23
Appendix 3. The New versus the Traditional Paradigm: A Radical and Difficult 
Shift in Managerial Common Sense 
  Conventional Common Sense  New Efficiency Principles and Practices  
Command and 
control 
Centralized command 
Vertical control 
Cascade of supervisory levels 
‘Management knows best’ 
Central goal setting and coordination 
Local autonomy/horizontal self-control 
Self-assessing/self-improving units 
Participatory decision making 
Structure  Stable pyramid, growing in height and 
complexity as it expands 
Flat, flexible network of very agile units 
Remains flat as it expands 
Parts and links  Clear vertical links 
Separate, specialized functional 
departments 
Interactive, cooperative links between 
functions, along each product line 
Style and 
operation 
Optimized smooth-running organizations 
Standard routines and procedures 
‘There is one best way’ 
Definition of individual tasks 
Single-function specialization 
Single top-down line of command 
Single bottom-up information flow 
Continuous learning and improvement 
Flexible system/adaptable procedures 
‘A better way can always be found’ 
Definition of group tasks 
Multiskilled personnel/ad hoc teams 
Widespread delegation of decision making 
Multiple horizontal and vertical flows 
Personnel and 
training 
Labour as variable cost 
Market provides trained personnel 
People to fit the fixed posts 
Discipline as main quality 
Labour as human capital 
Much in-house training and retraining 
Variable posts/adaptable people 
Initiative/collaboration/motivation 
Equipment and 
investment 
Dedicated equipment 
One optimum plant size for each product 
Each plant anticipates demand growth 
Strive for economies of scale for mass 
production 
Adaptable/programmable/flexible equipment 
Many efficient sizes/optimum relative 
Organic growth closely following demand 
Choice or combination of economies of 
scale, scope or specialization 
Production 
programming 
Keep production rhythm; use inventory to 
accommodate variation in demand 
Produce for stock; shed labour in slack 
Adapt rhythm to variation in demand 
Minimize response time (‘Just-in-time’) 
Use slack for maintenance and training 
Productivity 
measurement 
A specific measure for each department 
(purchasing, production, marketing, etc.) 
Percent tolerance on quality and rejects 
Total productivity measured along the whole 
chain for each product line 
Strive for zero defects and zero rejects 
Suppliers, 
clients and 
competitors 
Separation from the outside world: 
Foster price competition among suppliers 
Make standard products for mass 
customers 
Arm’s-length oligopoly with competitors 
The firm as a closed system 
Strong interaction with outside world: 
Collaborative links with suppliers, with 
customers and, in some cases, with 
competitors (basic R&D, for instance) 
The firm as an open system 
Source: Perez (2004) 
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